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NOTES
BIOPHILIA, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, AND A NEW
ENDANGERED SPECIES PARADIGM
It is estimated that we share the planet with between ten and
one hundred million other species.1 Surprisingly, humans have
given names to approximately 1.4 million species, a fraction of the
total.2 We have, however, brought about the extinction of an
estimated 10% of the species that existed before humanity came on
the scene, and it is predicted that another 20% will be lost in the
next thirty years.' One scholar has noted that "[t]he extinction
event now taking place rivals the five great extinctions that have
occurred in the earth's geologic history, only this time it is humans,
not asteroids, that are the cause."4 Humanity has begun to
recognize this catastrophe5 and, in some cases, has taken action.
1. See Edward 0. Wilson, Biophilia and the Conservation Ethic, in THE BIOPHILIA
HYPOTHESIS 31,35 (Stephen R. Kellert & Edward 0. Wilson eds., 1993).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 36.
4. Patrick Parenteau, Rearranging the Deck Chairs: Endangered Species Act Reforms
in an Era ofMass Extinction, 22 WM. &MARYENVTL. L. & POLYREV. 227,230-31 (1998). The
five great extinctions are the Ordovician (440 million years ago), the Devonian (370 milion
years ago), the Permian (250 million years ago), the Triassic (210 million years ago), and the
Cretaceous (65 million years ago). See Virginia Morell, The Sixth Extinction, NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC, Feb. 1999, at 48-49.
5. A recent study suggests that it can take the earth up to 10 million years to recover
from large-scale extinctions. See Carol Kaesuk Yoon, Study Jolts Views on Recovery from
Extinctions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,2000, at A20.
An ominous implication of the new research, some scientists say, is that
humans may already or will soon have destroyed enough species that it will
require a full 10 million years for the planet to recover-20 times as long as
humans have already existed and longer than many scientists predicthumanity
itself is likely to persist into the future.
Id.
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The Endangered Species Act (ESA)6 is one immediate, and poten-
tially powerful, response to the extinction of species in the United
States.
Unfortunately, the recent failure of the judiciary to interpret the
ESA more expansively has limited the Act's ability to preserve
species.7 This failure is reflected in the courts' inability to properly
account for humanity's intrinsic connection with nature when
determining what constitutes "harm" under the ESA. If the courts
continue the perpetuation of a myopic understanding of the
interplay between human life and the environment, it is humanity
that inevitably will be affected.
The inherent connection that humanity maintains with nature,
christened "biophilia" by the Harvard biologist Edward Wilson,'
provides the impetus for an argument that courts should rethink
the way in which they have interpreted the ESA. Put simply, the
intrinsic affiliation with nature that exists within the human
species calls for an expansive interpretation of the ESA. This
expansion would result in a definition of harm that recognizes that
species must be protected from the potential, albeit conceivably
uncertain, harm that habitat destruction can effect. This Note
argues that biophilia provides the foundation for a judicial
expansion of the definition of "harm" under the ESA.
The first section of this Note contains an overview of biophilia.
The doctrine of biophilia intricately demonstrates humanity's
connection with the natural world; this connection is a key element
of the ESA. The first section also contains an extensive discussion
of the recognition afforded biophilia by other disciplines. This
recognition is indisputable.9 The judiciary, by failing to incorporate
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
7. This failure is illustrated by the Supreme Court's recent move toward a softening of
the prohibition against "balancing the value of protected species against the value of the
economic activities their protection might displace." Federico Cheever, Butterflies, Cave
Spiders, Milk-Vetch, Bunchgrass, Sedges, Lilies, Checker-Mallows and Why the Prohibition
Against Judicial Balancing of Harm Under the Endangered Species Act is a Good Idea, 22
WM. & MARYENVTL. L. & POLYREv. 313, 313,321 (1998) (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187-88 (1978)).
8. See EDwARD 0. WILSON, BioPHmLA 1 (1984).
9. See infra notes 25-51 and accompanying text.
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this theory into the legal decision-making process, is an isolated
outpost detached from the realities of the scientific community.
Section two provides a detailed discussion of relevant case law
under the Act. The ESA provides that no one shall "harm" a species
that has been listed as endangered or threatened.'0 Much of this
section focuses on what constitutes "harm" to a species as defined
by the ESA, the Department of the Interior, and courts." The
Supreme Court's decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon' is perhaps the most important
case in this area of law, and, consequently, this section contains an
extensive discussion of Sweet Home. The Sweet Home court failed
to recognize biophilia and, in so doing, permitted an overly narrow
definition of "take" under the ESA. Had the Court recognized the
intrinsic connection between humanity and nature, it would have
concluded that "harm" to a species can occur in a myriad of ways far
short of "significant habitat modification or degradation that
actually kills or injures wildlife.'"
Section two also considers standing under the ESA'4 and
concludes that the Supreme Court's decision in Bennett v. Spear 5
failed to adequately recognize Congress's biophilic intent in passing
the Act. Had the Court subscribed to this purpose, it would have
recognized that affording standing to nonenvironmental interests
is inherently incompatible with the ESA's goal of protecting
endangered species. A better approach to endangered species
legislation is illustrated through the adoption of the concept of
aesthetic value, which has occurred in the standing context. This
concept is kindred to a biophilic approach; the leap from a
recognition of the aesthetic value that humanity places on the
natural world is akin to the recognition of our inherent connection
with living organisms.
Section three provides a synopsis of the history of the ESA,
including an examination of the legislative history and underlying
10. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
11. See infra notes 56-100 and accompanying text.
12. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
13. Id. at 708 (emphasis added).
14. See infra notes 101-18 and accompanying text.
15. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
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purpose of the Act. When enacting the ESA, Congress recognized
humanity's connection with nature as a primary purpose for
protecting species. Wlhile the theory ofbiophilia was not developed
until well after the enactment of the ESA, the belief that humans
have an intrinsic connection with the natural world was certainly
an extensive part of the dialogue that occurred within Congress
prior to passage of the Act.
Finally, section four provides an overview of the limits of
biophilia and discusses the new endangered species paradigm that
will invariably result from the adoption of biophilia. The very
purpose of the ESA provides courts with the latitude they need to
introduce biophilia into the legal world; yet, an unconstrained ESA
is certainly not the end goal of the biophilia paradigm. Rather, the
recognition of biophilia creates a definition of "harm" that
includes potential future harm to species, and also incorporates
anthropogenic harm into the decision-making process. This
definition also precludes a balancing approach to endangered
species protection, based largely on the central purpose of the ESA,
and also precludes nonenvironmental interests from satisfying
standing under the Act.
The ESA recognizes that species are vitally important, both for
biocentric as well as anthropocentric reasons. Biophilia provides a
compelling anthropocentric reason for protecting species that
should be incorporated by the judiciary. The end result of this
incorporation includes not simply increased protection of
endangered species, but also an enduring enrichment to
humanity.17
16. See infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
17. See STEPHENR. KELLERT, KINSHIPTOMASTERY9 (1997) ("Ournourishingexperience
of nature is, ultimately, a celebration of our humanity."). The new endangered species
paradigm is therefore both symbolic and substantive. It is symbolic in the sense that it
affords recognition to the inherent value which humanity places on the natural world. This
recognition is, by itself, meaningful. It is substantive in that it affords increased protection
to endangered species that is otherwise not provided by a more narrow definition of harm.
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BIOPHILIA
What is Biophilia?
In Biophilia, the biologist Edward 0. Wilson"8 presents the
argument that human beings have an intrinsic connection with
nature. Biophilia, he explains, is "the innate tendency to focus on
life and lifelike processes."19
From infancy we concentrate happily on ourselves and other
organisms. We learn to distinguish life from the inanimate and
move toward it like moths to a porch light. Novelty and
diversity are particularly esteemed.... I will make the case
that to explore and affiliate with life is a deep and complicated
process in mental development. To an extent still undervalued
in philosophy and religion, our existence depends on this
propensity, our spirit is woven from it, hope rises on its
currents.
There is more. Modern biology has produced a genuinely new
way of looking at the world that is incidentally congenial to the
inner direction of biophilia. In other words, instinct is in this
rare instance aligned with reason. The conclusion I draw is
optimistic: to the degree that we come to understand other
organisms, we will place a greater value on them, and on
ourselves.20
This simple, yet elegant concept-that human beings have an
innate, genetic connection with nature-suggests astounding
ramifications. Biophilia encompasses every action we take: every
house we build, every painting we create, and every poem we
write 1 is shaped by our affiliation with the natural world and with
18. Wilson is probably best known for his work on biodiversity, his research on ants, and
the theory of island biogeography developed with the mathematician Robert H. MacArthur.
See generally BERT HOLLDOBLER & EDwARD 0. WHSON, THE ANTS (1990); ROBERT H.
MACARTHuR& EDWARD O. WILSON, THE THEORYOF ISLAND BIOGEOGRAPHY (1967); EDwARD
0. WILSON, THE DrvSITY OF LIFE (1992). For an outstanding summary of Wilson's theory
of island biogeography, see generally DAvID QUAMIEN, THE SONG OF THE DoDo, IsLAND
BIOGEOGRAPHY IN AN AGE OF EXTINCTIONS (1996).
19. WILSON, supra note 8, at 1.
20. Id. at 1-2.
21. The poet Walt Whitman wrote:
I believe a leaf of grass is no less than the journey-work of the stars,
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other life forms. "The significance of biophilia in human biology is
potentially profound .... It is relevant to our thinking about
nature, about the landscape, the arts, and mythopoeia, and it
invites us to take a new look at environmental ethics."22
Thus, through our common DNA and through millions of years
of co-evolution, we invariably have developed a connection with
other species. The evidence of biophilia is not speculative but rather
quite concrete. Cultural norms and patterns indicate that biophilia
is ubiquitous to the human species. Wilson cites as one of the
strongest examples the universal awe of the serpent that is found
in all cultures, from the Hopi Indians2 to urban New Yorkers.
These cultural manifestations may seem at first detached and
mysterious, but there is a simple reality behind the ophidian
archetype that lies within the experience of ordinary people.
The mind is primed to react emotionally to the sight of snakes,
not just to fear them but to be aroused and absorbed in their
details, to weave stories about them.'
And the pismire is equally perfect, and a grain of sand, and the egg of the wren,
And the tree-toad is a chef-d'oeuvre for the highest,
And the running blackberry would adorn the parlors of heaven,
And the narrowest hinge in my hand puts to scorn all machinery,
And the cow crunching with depress'd head surpasses any statue,
And a mouse is miracle enough to stagger sextillions of infidels.
KELLERT, supra note 17, at 138 (quoting WALT WHITmAN, LEAVES OF GRASS (AND OTHER
WoRiKs) (1897)).
22. Wilson, supra note 1, at 32. One example of biophilia's presence within American
mythopoeia is Dr. Seuss's famous story The Lorax:
It's a Truffula Seed.
It's the last one of all!
You're in charge of the last of the Truffula Seeds.
And Truffula Trees are what everyone needs.
Plant a new Truffula. Treat it with care.
Give it clean water. And feed it fresh air.
Grow a forest. Protect it from axes that hack.
Then the Lorax
and all of his friends
may come back.
THEODOR SEUSS GEISEL, THE LORAX (1971).
23. "The Hopi know Palulukon, the water serpent, a benevolent but frightening godlike
being." WILSON, supra note 8, at 85-86.
24. Id. at 86.
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Evidence of the Tenability of Biophilia
The legal world stands alone by failing to adopt biophilia or even
make reference to it when reaching decisions that affect the
survival of species. The theory of biophilia is not cited in any
reported federal case.' This might give the indication that biophilia
and its architect, Edward Wilson, are not taken seriously in the
scientific world or in other academic areas. Reality tells a different
story: recognition of biophilia is prevalent in many academic
disciplines including economics, sociology, architecture, and
mythology.
26
Within the economic field, there are a number of methodologies
that have been developed to value the environment. Contingent
valuation, for example, uses social survey techniques to ascertain
how we value the natural world.' "Claims for this approach have
recently been much urged in both official and academic circles, and
it has found serious political favour."29 Contingent valuation studies
indicate that human beings place ahigh value on the natural world.
For example, one willingness-to-pay study estimated that the
elephants in Kenya provide a value of $25 million per annum, "a
sum almost ten times the value of poached ivory exports." 0
Furthermore, the economic value ofecotourismis high, especially
on a global scale. "[Nature and wildlife tourism may now account
for as much as 10 percent of the $300 billion world tourism market,
growing at an estimated 10 to 20 percent rate in recent years."31 In
a recent public opinion survey, 63% of respondents cited "the
beauty of nature" as a reason for protecting the environment. 32 It
25. Based on a Westlaw search conducted on January 17, 2001.
26. See generally THE BIOPHILIA HYPOTHESIS, supra note 1.
27. These include direct valuation approaches like contingent valuation as well as
indirect valuation methods such as the travel cost approach, which "uses observed
expenditures on the travel to recreational sites to estimate the benefit arising from the
recreational experience." DAvID PEARCE & DOMINIC MORAN, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF
BIODIVERsrTy 65 (1994).
28. See John Foster, Introduction: Environmental Value and the Scope of Economics, in
VALUINGNATURE? ETHICS, ECONOMICS,ANDTHEENVIRONENT 1, 7-8 (John Foster ed., 1997)
(arguing that the environmental field is not the appropriate place for economics).
29. Id.
30. PEARCE & MORAN, supra note 27, at 90.
31. STEPHEN R. KELLERT, THE VALUE OF LIFE 79 (1996).
32. F. KAID BENFIELD ETAL., ONCE THERE WERE GREENFELDS 73 (1999).
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is also estimated that perhaps 5% to 10% of the American
population are active birdwatchers. 33 Americans speak with their
wallets; the value that we place on the environment demonstrates
our affiliation with nature.
In addition to economists, architects, particularly landscape
architects, have long recognized the value of the natural world.3,
Woody Allen is probably not an avid birdwatcher-he once said that
"[nature and I are two"3 --yet Allen himself lives in a city (New
York) that preserves some of the most valuable land in the world as
parkland. "The gardens of the ancient Egyptian nobility, the walled
gardens of Persian settlements in Mesopotamia, and the gardens of
merchants in medieval Chinese cities indicate that early urban
peoples went to considerable lengths to maintain contact with
nature."3 6
Psychological studies also support the significance of biophiia.3 1
For example, studies have indicated that natural settings,
particularly those with "savanna-like properties or nonturbulent
water features," provide humans with restorative benefits."8 This
psychological connection blends with landscape architecture. "9
"During the last two centuries, in several countries, the idea that
exposure to nature fosters psychological well-being, reduces the
stresses of urban living, and promotes physical health has formed
part of the justification for providing parks and other nature in
cities and preserving wilderness for public use."0
The religious world is also chock-full of biophilia. 1 "And of every
living thing of all flesh, two of every sort shalt thou bring into the
ark, to keep them alive with thee; they shall be male and female."2
33. See KELLERT, supra note 31, at 80.
34. See Roger S. Ulich,Biophilia, Biophobia, andNaturalLandscapes, in THE BIOPHILIA
HYPOTHESIS, supra note 1, at 73.
35. David W. Orr, Lovelt orLose It: The ComingBiophilia Revolution, in THEBIOPHILIA
HYPOTHESIS, supra note 1, at 415 (citing ERIC LAX, WOODY ALLEN: ABIOGRAPHY 39 (1992)).
36. Ulrich, supra note 34, at 73.
37. See id. at 108.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 73.
40. Id. (citations omitted).
41. Edward Wilson has even been described in reverent terms as"a conservation prophet
- an apostle preaching the biodiversity gospel." DAVID TAKACS, THE IDEA OF BIODIVERsITY
322 (1996).
42. Genesis 6:19 (King James).
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Noah was instructed to include not just "charismatic megafauna" 3
on the ark." "Of fowls after their kind, and of cattle after their
kind, of every creeping thing of the earth after his kind, two of
every sort shall come unto thee, to keep them alive."' The New
Testament also contains biophilic references. "Are not two sparrows
sold for a farthing? [Aind one of them shall not fall on the ground
without your Father."46
Edward Wilson is not simply a scholar whose theories are
relegated to the academic world. His theories are taken seriously
even in the political domain.' During recent efforts to dismantle
the ESA, Wilson was asked to meet with House Speaker Newt
Gingrich.' "If it could be arranged, would E.O. Wilson be willing to
come to Washington to talk to Gingrich about biodiversity, about
conservation, about the Endangered Species Act? When the
question was put to him, Wilson was intrigued and quite willing."4
9
Gingrich was receptive to Wilson's efforts' and refused to allow the
Young-Pombo bill, which would have undermined the ESA, to reach
the House floor.51 Biophilia, and its founder Edward Wilson, are
acclaimed in both academic and political circles, yet, inexplicably,
once we enter into the courtroom, we find that things are different.
43. One of the criticisms of the ESA is that it is biased towards large animals with
popular appeal--charismatic megafauna" such as grizzly bears and bald eagles. See
generally Shannon Petersen, Comment, Congress and Charismatic Megafauna:ALegislative
History of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 463 (1999) (analyzing the legislative
history of the ESA to show that its passage was inspired by the desire to preserve
"charismatic megafauna).
44. See Genesis 6:20 (King James).
45. Id
46. Matthew 10:29 (King James).
47. See Michael J. Bean, The Gingrich That Saved the ESA, ENVTL. F., JanlFeb. 1999,
at 26, 27-28.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 27-28.
50. Biophilia, like any genetically based trait, is expressed more strongly in some
individuals than in others. Biophilia ignores political borders. Some argue that Newt
Gingrich, for example, is a biophile.
[Als a ton-year-old boy, [he] had waged a virtual crusade to persuade state and
cityleaders to build a zoo in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.... [A] ten-year-old boy
with a passion for animals is hooked for life. Harvard biologist Edward 0.
Wilson, whom National Zoo Director Michael Robinson once called "the Homer
of biology," coined a term for this phenomenon: biophilia.
Id at 27.
51. See id. at 32.
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THE JUDICIARY'S FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE BIOPHILIA
Introduction to the ESA
Since its passage in 1973, the Endangered Species Act 52 has been
viewed as a panacea by many, and as a magnificent failure by
others." Criticisms of the ESA range from its failure to truly
protect species to its placement of the interests of animals and
plants above those of humans.54 Nevertheless, the very existence of
the ESA suggests that humans care about the natural world, that
we have a connection with other living organisms that is intrinsic
to our species.55
Akey component of the ESAis the designation of endangered and
threatened species by the Department of the Interior." The
Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with the Secretary of
Commerce, is charged with identifying species that are candidates
for listing.57 In addition, listing may be accomplished through
private petition." Factors included in the species listing deter-
mination are:
52. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
53. See generally CHARLES C. MANN & MARKL. PLUMMER, NOAH'S CHOICE, THE FUTURE
OF ENDANGERED SPEcIES 214-15 (1995) ("By any measure, efforts to achieve the lofty goals
mandated by the Endangered Species Act have failed .... [Tihe time has come to question
the goal that underlies the act: Save every species, no matter what the cost.").
54. For example, an Oklahoma road that was to be built to improve access to a hospital
for the Choctaw Indians was cancelled because of the presence of the endangered American
burying beetle (Nicrophorus americanus). "A HIGHWAY that would improve access to a
hospital serving the poor-can one imagine a more deserving public project? Yet through the
enforcement of the Endangered Species Act, the interests of a beetle were, in effect, elevated
above those of human beings." Id. at 24.
55. See infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
56. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Implementation of the ESA is largely
accomplished by the Department of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service. In addition, the
National Marine Fisheries Service within the Department of Commerce is charged with
protecting endangered and threatened marine floral and faunal species. See RAYVAUGHAN,
ENDANGERED SPEcIES ACT HANDBOOK 14 (1994).
57. One of the many difficulties with implementing the ESA is that the concept of
"species" is not easily defined. For example, the red wolf (Canis rufus) is listed as an
endangered species but some have argued that it is actually a subspecies of the gray wolf
(Canis lupus). Some scientists have also argued that the red wolf is actually a cross between
the gray wolf and the coyote. See JAN DEBLIEU, MEANT TO BE WiLD 33-34 (1993).
58. See VAUGHAN, supra note 56, at 23-27.
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(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or
curtailment of its habitat or range;
(B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or
educational purposes;
(C) disease or predation;
(D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or
(E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued
existence.59
Once a determination is made to list a species, the Secretary of the
Interior publishes the listing along with a designation of habitat
that is critical to the survival of the species.6" The Secretary must
then develop and implement a recovery plan for the listed species
that includes the designation of critical habitat required to enable
the given species to recover.61
Section 9 of the ESA states that it is unlawful for any person to
"take" an endangered species.62 The Act defines take to include
"harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."" The
Secretary further defined harm by issuing regulations stating that
"[h]arm in the definition of 'take' in the Act means an act which
actuallykills or injures wildlife. Such an act mayinclude significant
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,
including breeding, feeding or sheltering."64 This interpretation of
"harm" under the ESA drives a great deal of the controversy
surrounding the Act and recent case law suggests that the judiciary
is moving away from its earlier expansive approach to a more
narrow interpretation of the harm provision of the ESA.65 This
expansive definition was set out in the famous Tellico Dam case
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (1994).
60. See id. § 1533(b)(2). Critical habitat refers to "the specific areas ... on which are
found those physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and
(I) which may require special management considerations or protection." Id. §
1532(5XA)(i).
61. See id. § 1533(f) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
62. See id. § 1538(a)(1)(B)-(C).
63. Id. § 1532(19).
64. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1999).
65. See Cheever, supra note 7, at 320-21.
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(TVA)66 and in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural
Resources.67
Judicial Myopia
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill. s Defining the Concept of
Harm
The Tellico Dam case is perhaps the most notable precedent in
the world of endangered species litigation.69 In 1966, Congress
authorized the Tellico Dam Project in the Little Tennessee River
Valley.7 The dam was nearly complete when environmental
plaintiffs and local residents sued to stop construction.' Completion
of the dam would, they argued, destroy the remaining habitat of a
small fish, the snail darter, and result in the species' extinction.7 2
The Supreme Court agreed and held that the ESA was perfectly
clear on this issue and construction of the dam must cease./
It is hard to overemphasize the significance of the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.
Not only did it remain the only Supreme Court consideration of
the substantive provisions of the Endangered Species Act for
seventeen years, it also characterized the Act as placing the
goal of "revers[ing] the trend toward species extinction" above
considerations of cost, and explicitly precluded courts from
engaging in traditional equitable balancing in determining
whether to issue an injunction in the face of a violation of the
Act.74
The Court's decision not to allow a balancing of interests under the
ESA indicates both the strength of the Act as well as the deference
afforded Congressional intent.
66. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
67. 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988), mot. denied, 73 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Haw. 1999).
68. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
69. See Hill, 437 U.S. 153; Cheever, supra note 7, at 316.
70. See Cheever, supra note 7, at 315-16.
71. See Hill, 437 U.S. at 157-58.
72. See id. at 153.
73. See id. at 154-55.
74. Cheever, supra note 7, at 316 (footnote omitted).
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Lower Court Approaches: Refining the Concept of Harm
Lower courts have continued to recognize the TVA approach to
the ESA. In Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural
Resources,5 environmental groups claimed that the existence of
feral sheep in the habitat of the endangered Palila bird constituted
a "taking" under the ESA. 6 The court agreed and held that allowing
the sheep to live in the Palla's habitat constituted a taking. In so
holding, the court stated that "Itihe Secretary's inclusion of habitat
destruction that could result in extinction follows the plain
language of the statute because it serves the overall purpose of the
Act, which is 'to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved. '"7 After focusing on the purpose of the Act, the court
then looked to the legislative history of the ESA. "[I]n the Senate
Report on the Act: "'Take' is defined in... the broadest possible
manner to include every conceivable way in which a person can
'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife."78 Perhaps most
importantly, the court found that harm includes "habitat destruc-
tion that could result in extinction."79 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
included potential harm to a species under the "take" definition.'0
75. Three prior suits had been brought against the Hawaii Department of Natural
Resources to remove other types of feral sheep and goats from the Paila's habitat. See Palila
v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palfla I), 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979),
affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981); Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources
(Palila II), 639 F.2d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 1981); Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural
Resources (Paila I1), 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), affd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
76. See Pa!lla, 852 F.2d at 1106, 1107.
77. Id. at 1108 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994)).
78. Id. (alteration in original) (citing S. REP. No. 93-307, at 7 (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989,2995).
79. Id. at 1110 (emphasis added).
80.
[Tihe Ninth Circuit applies a significant risk of harm standard to all takings
claims while characterizing these claims as takings by "harm" Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit analysis characterizes injury to endangered species that will
allegedly take place in the future as "actual harm" within the meaning of the
regulatory definition of that term if a party can demonstrate that the harm is
reasonably certain to occur.
Alicia M. Grifn, Note, Beyond "Harm"Abandoning theActual Injury Standard for Certain
Prohibited Takings Under the Endangered Species Act by Giving Independent Meaning to
"Harassment"52 VAND. L. nv. 1831,1858-59 (1999) (footnotes omitted); see also Defenders
of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that "we held that the
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This relatively broad approach is not, however, followed by all other
jurisdictions.8 1
The First Circuit, in particular, has held that harm can be found
only where proof of actual past or present injury to the endangered
species is demonstrated.82 In American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti,a the
Court of Appeals stated that "[tihe proper standard for establishing
a taking under the ESA, far from being a numerical probability of
harm, has been unequivocally defined as a showing of 'actual
harm."' 4 The court then held that the plaintiffs failed to show that
bald eagles were ingesting lead bullets used by hunters.'s The court
went on to note: "[olur review of the record indicates that bald
eagles can be harmed by the ingestion of lead. There is, however, no
evidence in the record of any harm to the bald eagles at Quabbin as
a result of the 1991 deer hunt."
86
The First Circuit would be aided by a biophilic approach to the
ESA. To require "nothing less than one hundred percent certainty of
death or injury to an endangered species"" is at odds with the
biophilic purpose of the Act. 8 The ESA is designed specifically to
avoid waiting until a species is close to extinction to protect it. It
may be impossible to show with absolute certainty that habitat
destruction is injuring or killing an endangered species. Habitat
Supreme Coures decision in Sweet Home does not overrule Rosboro and that a reasonably
certain threat of imminent harm to a protected species is sufficient for issuance of an
injunction under section 9 of the ESA"); Marbled Murrelet v. Babbit, 83 F.3d 1060,1066 (9th
Cir. 1996) ("A reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to a protected species is sufficient
for issuance of an injunction...."); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d
1508,1511 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that"Itihe plaintiffrmust make a showing that a violation
of the ESA is at least likely in the future"). But see Arizona Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. United
States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1042 (D. Ariz. 1998) (stating that "[tihe
language of the regulation states that 'harm' includes habitat modification or degradation
only if it results in actual injury or death to wildlife").
81. See Griffin, supra note 80, at 1847.
82. See id.
83. 9 F.3d 163 (1st Cir. 1993).
84. Id. at 165.
85. See id. at 166.
86. Id.
87. Griflfm, supra note 80, at 1849.
88. See id ("Two elements of the appellate court's analysis, in fact, revealed that nothing
less than one hundred percent certainty of death or injury to an endangered species would
establish a taking.").
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destruction may, however, be harming a species in a myriad of ways
short of this standard.
Judiciary in Retreat: Confining the Concept of Harm
Perhaps most disturbing is the fact that the judiciary recently
has begun to question the prohibition on balancing economic
interests with environmental concerns under the ESA. In Babbitt
v. Sweet Home, parties who were dependent on the forest products
industry brought suit against the Department of the Interior,
arguing that the Secretary's definition of "take" was broader than
Congress intended when it enacted the ESA.89 The ESA defines
'take' as to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."90
The Secretary of the Interior further defined harm to include
"'significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually
kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering."9
1
The respondents raised three arguments in support of their
contention that Congress did not intend "take" to include habitat
modification:
First, they correctly noted that language in the Senate's original
version of the ESA would have defined "take" to include
"destruction, modification, or curtailment of [the] habitat or
range" of fish or wildlife, but the Senate deleted that language
from the bill before enacting it. Second, respondents argued
that Congress intended the Act's express authorization for the
Federal Government to buy private land in order to prevent
habitat degradation in § 5 to be the exclusive check against
habitat modification on private property. Third, because the
Senate added the term "harm" to the definition of "take" in a
floor amendment without debate, respondents argued that the
court should not interpret the term so expansively as to include
habitat modification.92
89. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon, 515 U.S.
687, 691 (1995).
90. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
91. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 691 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994)).
92. Id. at 693 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
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The Court cited three reasons why the Secretary's interpretation
of the Act was reasonable.9" First, the Court explained that an
ordinary understanding of the word "harm" supported this
interpretation.94 Second, the Court explained that:
the broad purpose of the ESA supports the Secretary's decision
to extend protection against activities that cause the precise
harms Congress enacted the statute to avoid. In TVA v. Hill, we
described the Act as "the most comprehensive legislation for the
preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation."
... As stated in § 2 of the Act, among its central purposes is "to
provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved...."5
The Court went on to explain that in TVA, it recognized that "[t]he
plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute.., was to halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This
is reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally
every section of the statute."96
The third reason recognized by the Court was the fact that
Congress authorized "the Secretary to issue permits for takings
that § 9(a)(1)(B) would otherwise prohibit, 'if such taking [was]
incidental to... the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity
.... "9" This exception suggests that Congress itself felt that §
9(a)(1)(B) prohibited indirect takings.9"
Sweet Home embodies an overly narrow concept of harm99 that
fails to consider biophilia. All three of the reasons mentioned by the
Court give support to an even broader interpretation of the ESA.
The purpose of the ESA, as embodied by biophilia, suggests a
decision more in line with Congressional intent.
93. See id. at 697.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 698 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)).
96. Id., 515 U.S. at 699 (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978)).
97. Id. at 700.
98. See id.
99. See Steve P. Quarles et al., Sweet Home and the Narrowing of Wildlife "Take" Under
Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act, [News & Analysis] 26 ENVTL. L. RP. (ENVTL. L.
INST.) 10003 (Jan. 1996).
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Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, also failed to recognize the
interconnectedness that biophilia suggests. She wrote that:
Proximate causation is not a concept susceptible of precise
definition. It is easy enough, of course, to identify the extremes.
The farmer whose fertilizer is lifted by a tornado from tilled
fields and deposited miles away in a wildlife refuge cannot, by
any stretch of the term, be considered the proximate cause of
death or injury to protected species occasioned thereby. At the
same time, the landowner who drains a pond on his property,
killing endangered fish in the process, would likely satisfy any
formulation of the principle. We have recently said that
proximate causation "normally eliminates the bizarre" ....
Proximate causation depends to a great extent on con-
siderations of the fairness of imposing liability for remote
consequences. 1°°
If Congress based the ESA on a biophilic purpose, this should play
a part in considering when a species is harmed; biophilic harm to
humans is a critical element of judicial consideration of the ESA.
O'Connor and the Sweet Home majority failed to recognize
Congress's biophilic intent and, in so doing, crafted a narrow
interpretation of harm that ignores the importance of habitat
preservation in ameliorating potential future harm to species.
Standing under the ESA
Biophilic harm also plays an important role when considering the
citizen suit provisions of the ESA. InBennett v. Spear, ranchers and
other "nonenvironmental" interests filed suit under the citizen suit
provisions of the ESA'0 ' over the decision of the Fish and Wildlife
Service to limit water flow to an irrigation project in order to
protect two endangered fish species. 2 The central issue in the case,
however, was whether the nonenvironmental interests satisfied the
constitutional standing requirement. This requirement stems from
Article 1I of the Constitution, which allows the judicial branch of
100. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 713 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
101. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994). This section states that "any person may commence
a civil suit on his own behalf." Id
102. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 159 (1997).
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government to hear "cases" and "controversies."' 3 "The doctrine of
standing refers to a person's right to bring a lawsuit before a
court."""' Under the standing doctrine, a plaintiff must meet three
elements to bring suit: (1) an injury in fact that is concrete and
particularized as well as actual or imminent; (2) a demonstration
that the injury is fairly traceable to the acts of the defendant; and
(3) a showing that it is likely (not speculative) that the injury will
be redressed by a decision favorable to the plaintiff.'0 5 "The party
invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these
elements."1°'
Justice Scalia, writingfor the majority in Bennett, explained that:
It is true that the plaintiffs here are seeking to prevent
application of environmental restrictions rather than to
implement them. But the "any person" formulation applies to
all the causes of action authorized by § 1540(g)-not only to
actions against private violators of environmental restrictions,
and not only to actions against the Secretary asserting
underenforcement under § 1533, but also to actions against the
Secretary asserting overenforcement under § 1533.07
The Court thus held that the citizen suit provisions of the ESA also
applied to nonenvironmental interests.' But what Justice Scalia
and the Bennett majority failed to consider is the underlying
purpose of the ESA and its roots in biophilia.'19 This purpose, to
preserve endangered species, coupled with the prohibition against
balancing economic interests as specified in TVA, supports the
argument that the citizen suit provisions should be limited to
environmental concerns.
103. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
104. Todd William Roles, Note, Has the Supreme Court Armed Property Owners in Their
Fight Against Environmentalists? Bennett v. Spear and its Effect on Environmental
Litigation, 41 ARIz. L. REv. 227, 229-30 (1999).
105. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
106. Id. at 561 (citations omitted).
107. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 166.
108. See id.
109. Wilson mentions the standing issue in Biophilia, although the question he raises is
whether nonhuman organisms should have standing to sue. See WILSON, supra note 8, at
130-31.
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Despite expanding the ability of nonenvironmental interests to
bring suit, the Court has limited the ability of environmental
advocates to sue under the ESA. In the case of Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife,"' the Supreme Court failed to recognize that human
beings can be 'imminently harmed" by the loss of species in a
myriad of ways dictated by our innate connection with the natural
world."' In Lujan, environmentalists sued the Department of the
Interior over regulations that required federal agencies to confer
with the .Secretary of the Interior only with respect to federally
funded projects located within the United States and on the high
seas." Under these regulations, federal projects overseas were not
required to undergo any agency review to ensure conformity with
the ESA."' Defenders of Wildlife obtained affidavits from two
members who claimed that they suffered an injury in fact." 4 One
member stated in the affidavit that she had traveled to the Nile in
1986 and viewed the habitat of the endangered Nile crocodile." 5 A
second member of the organization stated that she traveled to Sri
Lanka in 1981 and observed the habitat of endangered species
including the Asian elephant."6 Both members claimed that they
intended to return to each area in the future to attempt to view
endangered species." 7 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held
that the environmental groups lacked standing because they did not
assert a sufficiently imminent injury." 8
Biophilia suggests that imminent harm can include even the
knowledge that a species is exterminated on the other side of the
globe."19
110. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
111. See id. at 560-62.
112. See id. at 558-59.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 563.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 556, 578.
119. This argument holds increasing weight as our world becomes smaller and more
entwined. Modern technology allows us to gather information from around the Earth in a few
seconds: the era of the "global village" has truly arrived. The birth or death of a panda, for
example, can be broadcast around the world in minutes. Technology, through media such as
the Internet, has thus increased the potential for anthropocentric injury even when a species
is exterminated on the opposite end of the globe.
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Many implications stem from the notion that people have a
fundamental physical, emotional, and intellectual dependence
on nature and living diversity. Above all, the meaningful and
satisfying experience of these values may represent a vital
expression of healthy human functioning and relationship to the
natural world. Conversely, the erosion of this dependence on
nature might signify considerable risk to humans materially,
affectively, cognitively, and even spiritually. Most discussions
of the harmful impacts of the species extinctions occurring
annually-currently estimated at 15,000 to 30,000-have
focused on the loss of material benefits to people such as fewer
medicines, agricultural products, or diminished ecosystem
functioning. These losses certainly represent substantial
threats to human well-being, but the biophilia notion suggests
that far more may be at stake than just the diminution of
people's material options. The degradation of life on earth might
also signify the possibility of diminished emotional and
intellectual well-being and capacity.120
A Better Approach: Aesthetic Value Cases
The aesthetic value' 2' that humans place on nature provides an
additional linchpin in the argument for the adoption of biophilia.
Numerous court cases have recognized aesthetic value, particularly
in the context of the standing doctrine.' Courts have notably
adopted a "biophilic" approach in cases involving standing and the
Animal Welfare Act." In Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Glickman,"24 the court held that the plaintiffs aesthetic interest in
seeing animals living in a nurturing habitat at a zoo constituted an
120. KELLERT, supra note 31, at 7 (footnote omitted).
121. What is aesthetic value? Aesthetic experience "is not unlike... the experience of
wonder. 'the power of the displayed object to stop the viewer in his or her tracks, to convey
an arresting sense of uniqueness, to evoke an exalted attention.' Sarah Harding, Value,
Obligation and Cultural Heritage, 31 ARiz. ST. L.J. 291, 332-33 (1999) (footnote omitted).
"Whether the experience is thought of as predominantly emotional, cognitive, or imaginative,
it is recognized as an essential aspect of human experience." Id. at 333.
122. See Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
123. See 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a) (1994) (describing the Secretary's ability to "promulgate
standards to govern the humane handling, care, treatment and transportation of animals").
124. 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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injury in fact for standing purposes. 2 5 This interest is simply
another way of saying that the impairment of a plaintiffs biophilic
connection with other living organisms constitutes a sufficient
injury to satisfy standing. In fact, the court recognized that this
interest is just as appropriately applied to endangered species
litigation. "[A] number of cases that have recognized standing based
on an aesthetic interest in the observation of animals have involved
government action that allegedly threatened to diminish the overall
supply of an animal species. " " If courts are willing to recognize the
aesthetic value of nature to humans in their decisions, there is no
reason to refuse to consider biophilia as well.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE ROLE OF NATURE IN THE
PROMULGATION OF THE ESA
As an underlying anthropocentric reason for protecting species,
biophilia is an intricate component of the ESA. Congress passed the
ESA to "provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved, [and] to provide a program for the conservation of such
endangered species and threatened species."'27 Congress also
mandated that all federal departments and agencies act toward
conserving endangered and threatened species3
28
Congress implicitly recognized the role of biophilia when it en-
acted the ESA. "The legislative history demonstrates Congressional
alarm regarding species extinction. In utilitarian terms, members
of Congress referred to mankind's relatively recent evolution, the
interconnectedness ofspecies, the human homogenization of habitats
125. See id. at 431-32. Animal Legal Defense Fund provided the court with an affidavit
from Marc Jurnove. Jurnove enjoyed visiting zoos and other parks near his home where
exotic animals were kept. At one zoo, "he saw particular animals enduring inhumane
treatment." Id at 431. The court went on to state that "Mr. Jurnove has made clear that he
has an aesthetic interest in seeing exotic animals living in a nurturing habitat, and that he
has attempted to exercise this interest by repeatedly visiting a particular animal exhibition
to observe particular animals there." Id. at 432.
126. Id. at 437 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992); Japan
Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 231 n.4 (1986)).
127. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
128. See id. § 1531(c)(1).
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in which plants and animals evolved, the resulting acceleration of
extinction, and the incalculable loss posed to humankind." 129
The legislative history of the ESA, moreover, contains a number
of biophilia-like references. "Many of these animals simply give us
esthetic [sic] pleasure. We like to view them in zoos and in their
natural habitats."30 "[Alt least one legislator pointed out the value
derived from the mere knowledge that wild species exist, regardless
of the aesthetic 'use' of the species." 1 1 Senator Harrison Williams
(D-NJ) stated that "[m]ost animals are worth very little in terms of
dollars and cents. However, their esthetic value is great indeed. The
pleasure of simply observing them... is unmeasurable."13 2 Biophilia
is therefore intrinsic to the ESA. "The ESA seeks to preserve
species for the hearts and minds, rather than the wallets, of present
and future generations. It reflects 'biophilia,' the yearning and
perhaps need human beings have for an intimate relationship with
the natural world."133
A NEW ENDANGERED SPECIES PARADIGM
There are therefore three reasons why biophilia should be applied
to the ESA. First, one of the primary purposes behind the ESA is a
biophilic one; Congress considered humanity's connection with the
natural world as intrinsic to the Act. Second, the recognition of
biophilia, in one form or another, is commonplace in other academic
disciplines and professions. From religion to architecture, biophilia
permeates our lives and it is anomalous for the judiciary to stand
alone in failing to recognize the doctrine. Finally, adopting biophilia
in the courtroom may not be such a momentous leap after all;
129. Jacqueline Lesley Brown, Preserving Species: The Endangered Species Act Versus
Ecosystem Management Regime, Ecological and Political Considerations, and
Recommendations for Reform, 12 J. ENvTL. L. & LrITG. 151, 165 (1997) (footnote omitted)
(emphasis added).
130. Joe Mann, Note, Making Sense of the Endangered Species Act: A Human-Centered
Justification, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 246, 258 (1999) (quoting 119 CONG. REC. 25,668
(statement of Sen. Tunney)).
131. Id. at 259 (citing 119 CONG. REC. 25,693 (statement of Sen. Domenici)).
132. Petersen, supra note 43, at 479 (quoting 119 CONG. REc. 25,675 (July 24, 1973)
(statement of Sen. Williams)).
133. Holly Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species: The Importance of Being Wild, 23
HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 1, 12 (1999) (footnote omitted).
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recognition of humanity's aesthetic valuation of nature supports the
inclusion of biophilic considerations in the judicial decision-making
process.
When considering cases under the ESA, courts should look to
biophilia as a core purpose behind the Act. Decisions should be
consistent with this purpose and should reflect the connection that
humanity has with the natural world. Biophilia lends support to a
revised definition of harm that recognizes habitat destruction and
potential future harm as critical to the core purpose of the ESA.
Biophilia should be viewed as a tool to be used to better
understand and evaluate the ESA. Humanity's innate connection
with nature is something that needs to be recognized by the courts.
Such an important concept should not be overlooked when
determining whether the courts are fulfilling congressional intent.
THE REACH OF BIOPHILIA
Biophilia, like any legal theory, has limitations. The concept of
biophilic harm to humans is a novel approach to endangered species
protection. Certainly Congress considered the effect that species'
extinction has on humanity; this was clearly a central purpose
behind the ESA. Yet courts are limited in applying this purpose by
standards that are extremely deferential to agency decisions.
Perhaps biophilia can play a role in other areas of the law as
well. For example, in assessing development and long-range
planning efforts, courts might consider biophilia. Biophilia may
shift the burden of proof to developers to demonstrate that their
project is more important than protecting this innate value.
Certainly biophilia has already made inroads in cases dealing with
standing. The progression from a recognition of aesthetic valuation
of nature to the adoption of biophilia is a natural step. The fact that
we place an aesthetic value on nature confirms the existence of an
intrinsic connection with the natural world. The presence of
biophilia, for example, was inherently evident when the Supreme
Court held that "the desire to use or observe an animal species,
even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable
interest for purpose of standing."" 4 But the judiciary must go
134. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992).
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further and recognize biophilia as a legitimate doctrine that codifies
our affiliation with the natural world. In doing so, the courts will be
recognizing a fundamental aspect of human nature: a biophilic
rationale for our actions and for protecting the natural world.
[Als biological knowledge grows the ethic will shift
fundamentally so that everywhere, for reasons that have to do
with the very fiber of the brain, the fauna and flora of a country
will be thought part of the national heritage as important as its
art, its language, and that astonishing blend of achievement
and farce that has always defined our species.3 5
L. Misha Preheim
135. WILSON, supra note 8, at 145.
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